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Abstract
Is one child more worthy of love, the opportunity to learn to read, a polio vaccination, or enough to eat than
another child? Those who answer “no,” should consider that when one makes the decision to conceive a child
instead of adopting an already existing child, one is saying that simply by virtue of its blood relation, a yet-to-
exist child who has no needs is more worthy of one’s time, love, energy and money than an existing orphan
who has great need. But if all children are equally worthy of love and resources, one must give these things
based on who needs them the most as opposed to any morally irrelevant characteristic such as race, sex,
birthplace, or potential biological relation to oneself, and already existing orphans desperately need these
things while yet-to-exist children do not need them at all. If one truly believes that all children are equally
worthy of love, education and material necessities, then one must act on the duty to adopt instead of
conceiving biological children.
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Equal Worth and the Duty to Adopt
Katharine Egan
Is one child more worthy of love, the opportunity to learn to read, a polio vaccination,
or enough to eat than another child? Those who answer “no,” should consider that when one
makes the decision to conceive a child instead of adopting an already existing child, one is
saying that simply by virtue of its blood relation, a yet-to-exist child who has no needs is
more worthy of one’s time, love, energy and money than an existing orphan who has great
need.1 But if all children are equally worthy of love and resources, one must give these
things based on who needs them the most as opposed to any morally irrelevant characteris-
tic such as race, sex, birthplace, or potential biological relation to oneself, and already existing
orphans desperately need these things while yet-to-exist children do not need them at all.2 If
one truly believes that all children are equally worthy of love, education and material neces-
sities, then one must act on the duty to adopt instead of conceiving biological children.3
One might object that biological relation to oneself is somehow in a different category
from traits like race, sex, or birthplace. Yet blood relation is an ascriptive aspect of identity
in the same way that race, sex, and birthplace are. Furthermore, these traits are all morally
irrelevant, as they are traits for which one bears no responsibility. As Martha Nussbaum, of
the University of Chicago, writes, “the accident of being born a Sri Lankan, or a Jew, or a
female, or an African-American, or a poor person, is just that-an accident of birth” and thus
should “not be taken to be a determinant of moral worth”.4 Aspects of identity that have no
bearing on the worth of a child cannot be used to justify bringing that child into the
world.5 6
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1 Indeed, you are saying that simply by virtue of its blood relation to you, a yet to exist child who has no
needs is more worthy of life than an existing child, for there are children who will die unless they are
adopted, as will be discussed later.
2 The rationale for the argument that people who have not yet been conceived do not have needs is that
yet to exist people cannot feel pleasure or pain and cannot have desires. The onus is on those who argue
that the not yet conceived have a need to exist to explain how a potential entity with no cognitive capac-
ity or ability to feel pleasure or pain can have a need. It is also important to note that arguing that we do
not have a duty to our own yet to exist child is not the same as arguing that we don’t have duties to
future generations. We have duties to future generations because they are going to exist and have needs.
We don’t have duties to our own yet to exist children before they exist because they are only going to
exist (and thus have needs) if we create them.
3 This argument relies on the fact that there are limited resources in the world, and that therefore, any
resources that go to a biological child cannot go to an already existing child. The resources your biologi-
cal child will require could have gone to an already existing child if you had chosen to adopt instead.
4 Nussbaum, Martha, ed. For Love of Country? Boston: Beacon Press, 2002, p. 133.
I argue later that aspects of identity for which one is responsible-one’s actions-also don’t affect one’s
worth. One might ask how I can argue that aspects of identity for which we are not responsible such as
race and biological relation don’t affect one’s worth using the reasoning that one is not responsible for
them when I argue that even aspects of identity for which we are responsible don’t affect our worth. My
reply is that even if one disagrees and believes that actions do affect one’s worth, one must concede that
it would be totally arbitrary and thus unjust to treat people unequally based on traits over which one has
no control such as race, sex, and blood relation. Nevertheless, I must admit that it wouldn’t be arbitrary
to value them differently based on their actions, even though I don’t agree with doing so.
5 Once your biological child exists, you are justified in prioritizing her needs over those of other children,
not because she is worth more than other children, but because you have incurred a special duty to do
so. This will be discussed more later.
6 One would have to weigh the interests of one’s yet to be conceived biological child more heavily than the
interests of an already existing orphan in order to make the decision to conceive a biological child-to
bring one’s biological child into the world.
While a yet to exist child has no interests, potential parents do have interests, and
thus one could also object that we should be weighing the interests of the potential parents
against the interests of a child who needs to be adopted, rather than the interests of a yet-
to-exist child against the interests of a child who needs to be adopted. Yet as long as the
interests of all people are being weighed equally, the duty to adopt instead of conceive
remains.7 If equal weight is given to each person’s interests, there is a duty to help others
up until the point where one would “thereby be sacrificing something of comparable moral
importance” to what the recipient of one’s help would have to sacrifice if help was not
received.8 Potential parents have a duty to adopt because the sacrifices they may make by
adopting will not be nearly as great as the sacrifices that an orphan must make if the par-
ents choose to conceive instead of adopt.
The sacrifices of parents who choose to adopt instead of conceive are numerous. Such
parents may sacrifice the greater degree of happiness they might have experienced with a
biological instead of an adopted child. This greater degree of happiness might have come
from the experience of love and commitment that can come with combining one’s genes
with those of one’s life partner, or from the knowledge that one’s bloodline will continue.
Adoptive parents might also sacrifice the likelihood that their child will be relatively free of
problems. While children can make great strides in development once they are adopted,9
some adopted children—particularly those who suffered in institutional care the longest—
do not completely overcome the resulting cognitive, emotional, or physical problems. Some
children may suffer from speech and other developmental delays, lower than average I.Q.’s,
difficulty attaching to their adoptive parents, or chronic illnesses such as hepatitis.
Adoptive parents must also sacrifice the money required to adopt. This advocates that par-
ents adopt the children who will suffer the most if they are not adopted-children from less
affluent countries-and international adoptions can cost $15,000 to $20,000.10 Yet none of
these sacrifices would constitute a sacrifice of a basic necessity,11 and thus none would be
of comparable moral importance to what orphans must sacrifice if they are not adopted.
In orphanages all over the world, children are dying and sacrificing basic necessities.
Thus, the sacrifice parents make when they choose to adopt instead of conceive must be
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7 The principle of equal consideration of interests has ancient roots, notably, in Cicero’s On The Laws. I
will discuss this principle in detail later.
8 This particular formulation of the principle of equal treatment is from Famine, Affluence, and Morality
in Philosophy and Public Affairs by Peter Singer vol. 1 No. 3 Spring, 1972, p. 231. He discusses this princi-
ple in detail in Practical Ethics 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 8-26 and
throughout. Page 21 is particularly clear.
9 A study of adopted children who had suffered severe deprivation in Romanian orphanages, including
malnutrition and chronic illness, found that the mean I.Q. of those adopted before the age of 6 months
increased from 63 to 107 by age four. The researchers found “no measurable deficit” in the growth and
development of these children. Of those adopted after the age of six months, the mean I.Q. increased
from 45 to 90. (Michael Rutter and the English and Romanian Adoptees Study Team,“Developmental
Catch-Up, and Deficit, Following Adoption After Severe Global Early Privation,” Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry 39, no. 4 (1998); 465-476.)
10 “International Adoption.” The Encyclopedia of Adoption. Ed. Christine Adamec and William L. Pierce,
Ph.D. New York: Facts on File Inc., 2000, p. 152.
11 Basic necessities are what one needs to stay physically and emotionally healthy: freedom from bodily
harm and fear of bodily harm, food, clean water, shelter, warm clothing, education, self-government
and the freedom to act unless such action involves harming others, freedom to form and maintain rela-
tionships with family and friends, and a certain amount of time free from work. As I will explain in
detail later, if sacrificing this money wouldn’t require parents to give up any basic necessities, it wouldn’t
constitute a sacrifice of comparable importance to what an orphan must sacrifice if she is not adopted,
and the duty to adopt would remain. However, I will also argue later that if sacrificing the money
would require parents to give up any basic necessities, the duty to adopt would also remain, for parents
can adopt from the U.S. for very little cost.
weighed against a child’s sacrifice of life or the basic necessities. The following are only a
few examples from around the world to illustrate what orphans sacrifice when they are not
adopted.12 A 1996 study done by Human Rights Watch/Asia revealed that child “welfare”
institutions in China “appear to serve, in effect, as death camps for orphans.” According to
the Chinese government’s own statistics, as reported by Human Rights Watch, the average
death rate in China’s child “welfare” institutions was 24.7 percent in 1989 (the most recent
official figure available). Worse, these official statistics underestimate the true death rate.
Human Rights Watch estimates that mortality rates in the late 80’s and early ‘90’s “in China’s
best-known and most prestigious orphanage, the Shanghai Children’s Welfare Institute,”
were probably running as high as 90 percent. Sickeningly, many of the children in China’s
institutions are dying from “an apparently systematic program” of elimination through the
intentional deprivation of food, water, and medical care. At the same “best-known and most
prestigious orphanage” in Shanghai, Human Rights Watch has documented extreme forms
of neglect and torture, which often result in death. Infants were usually not bottle-fed by
hand. Staff saved time by allowing infants to feed themselves. This led to deaths by choking
as well as starvation when children lost their grip and could not regain it on the bottle
because they were too young or weak to feed without assistance. Human Rights Watch has
discovered “several small children” in the Shanghai orphanage “tied to chairs, often wearing
only thin clothing with no shoes or socks, and able to relieve themselves only through holes
in the chair seats into chamberpots placed underneath,” to reduce staff workload. The
resulting inability of the children to move to become warm has led to deaths from
hypothermia. Common disciplinary measures can be defined as torture. Children are
forced to squat over bowls of boiling water, and scalded when they fall. It has also been
common to “hang children upside down with their heads submerged in water until nose-
bleeds and near suffocation ensue.”13
Orphans in other parts of the world are also sacrificing their lives and the basic neces-
sities. A study of children adopted from Romanian orphanages documented that before
their adoption,“severe malnutrition was the rule; chronic and recurrent respiratory infec-
tions were rife; chronic intestinal infections (including giardia) were common; and many of
the children had skin disorders of one kind or another.” The children were also found to be
developmentally delayed, with a mean IQ of 63.14 Human Rights Watch found in 1990 that
Romanian doctors caused large numbers of children to contract HIV when they carried out
blood transfusions in a misguided attempt to improve the health of institutionalized
orphans.15 In Armenia, UNICEF reported that in the winter of 2000, in what “was by no
means an isolated incident,” thirteen children died of malnutrition in an institution for chil-
dren. According to UNICEF, these institutions are filled to overflowing, and in most, there
is “a daily struggle to find food and clothing for the children.” In theory, the government
provides money for food, salaries, and basic upkeep. In practice,“directors often borrow
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12 Due to inaccurate reporting on the number of orphans and the level of orphan welfare in state orphan-
ages by most poor countries, it is necessary to rely on independent investigations of individual coun-
tries for this information. Unfortunately, it seems that such investigations have not been done in even a
majority of developing countries, and as a result, organizations like UNICEF and Human Rights Watch
do not have statistics on the total number of children in poor countries. Consequently, we must look at
orphanage conditions in countries where investigations have been done.
13 Death By Default: A Policy of Fatal Neglect in China’s State Orphanages. Human Rights Watch. New
York: Yale University Press. 1996.
14 Michael Rutter and the English and Romanian Adoptees Study Team,“Developmental Catch-Up, and
Deficit, Following Adoption After Severe Global Early Privation,” Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry 39, no. 4 (1998), p. 465-476.
15 Promises Broken: An Assessment of Children’s Rights on the 10th Anniversary of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Human Rights Watch. Dec. 1999. http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/promis-
es/orphans.html
money or beg for food on credit, and unpaid and impoverished staff have been known to
steal it. One director was recently taken to court for unpaid bills (a six month bread bill for
the orphanage in question.)” Government ministries order the severing of electricity,
water, gas, and telephone lines as bills are not met, unpaid because other ministries have
failed to pay.“In a number of institutions, gifted children from poor families learn along-
side the mentally disabled, studying curricula designed for the latter. Buildings are in a
state of dangerous disrepair. There is little or no heating.”16 In East Timor, UNICEF inves-
tigated 37 orphanages throughout the country, finding that “most centers cannot currently
provide” enough clothing, beds, mosquito nets, blankets, electricity, clean water or food for
the children in their care.17
In 1998, the Human Rights Watch found that in Russia was common for orphans in
state care to be beaten, locked in freezing rooms for days at a time and sexually abused.
Russian orphans live in a “baby house” until age five, where they often do not receive ade-
quate food, stimulation or education. At age four, they are given a single exam to test for
“normal development.” The entire future of these children is based on this exam, which
places children in one of three types of orphanage. The top tier of institutions is for ‘nor-
mal’ children; the middle tier is for the ‘learning disabled;’ the bottom grouping consists of
‘psycho-neurological’ orphanages. Children placed in the lowest level are not eligible for
education or future integration into society. They are often tied to their beds day and
night. At age eighteen they are moved to nursing homes, where they live with elderly and
handicapped people who need full-time care. Despite the fact that many children slotted
into the lowest tier are capable of learning at some level, there is no system for life training
and few attempts at anything beyond the most rudimentary education. Worse still, a child
can be placed in these low-level orphanages based entirely on a physical handicap, defor-
mity or bad behavior. Those who are placed in the higher levels also face a bleak fate. They
receive little education, and often do not learn to read or write. The vast majority “do not
have proper job skills or education to find sustainable work.”18 For orphans who are never
adopted out of the Russian system, the prospects are grim. According to a 1997 report by
the National Council for Adoption, 1 in 3 become homeless, 1 in 5 commit a crime, and 1
in 10 commit suicide.19 UNICEF estimates that by the end of 2003, there were 143 million
children in 93 developing countries who had lost both parents.20 Thus, it is obvious that
unless we take action to increase adoption, and to improve orphanage conditions, there
will continue to be orphans living and dying in such conditions for many years to come.
Because there are children who will die if they are not adopted, the choice to conceive
instead of adopt always means that a child will have to sacrifice life. As long as sacrificing
the money required to adopt would not require parents to give up the basic necessities,
parents have a duty to adopt these children because the sacrifice of one’s life is far greater
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16 Armenia’s Child Institutions. UNICEF 2001. http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/arme-
nia_496.html
17 Evaluation Report: 2001/2002: Assessment of the Situation of Separated Children and
Orphans in East Timor. Knudsen, C. http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase/index_14317.html
18 Promises Broken: An Assessment of Children’s Rights on the 10th Anniversary of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Human Rights Watch. Dec. 1999.
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/crp/promises/orphans.html. This website contains pictures of
Russian orphans who are so sick and malnourished that they look like concentration camp
victims.
19 “Russia.” The Encyclopedia of Adoption. Ed. Christine Adamec and William L. Pierce, Ph.D.
New York: Facts on File Inc., 2000, p. 235.
20 UNICEF Children on the Brink 2004 Factsheet:
http://www.unicef.org/media/files/COB_2004_fact_sheet.doc
than any of the sacrifices adoptive parents might have to make.21 They also have a duty to
adopt the orphans who are not dying but who are sacrificing basic necessities—their health,
dignity, chances for a normal life, educations, and the love of parents—for neither the
greater degree of happiness parents might have experienced with a biological instead of an
adopted child nor the likelihood that one’s child will be relatively free of problems consti-
tutes a necessity as basic as those that orphans must give up if they are not adopted. Thus, if
adoptive parents give equal weight to their own interests and the interests of orphans, they
must conclude that they have a duty to make a smaller sacrifice in order to prevent a child
from making a much greater sacrifice.
If the money required to adopt from less affluent countries would require adoptive
parents to give up any basic necessities, this would constitute a sacrifice of comparable
moral importance to what orphans must sacrifice if they are not adopted, and the duty to
adopt from overseas would not apply.22 However, those who cannot afford to adopt from
less affluent countries still have a duty to adopt instead of conceive because they can adopt
for no, or a very low, fee from the U.S. through the state’s public social services adoption
system.23 The duty to adopt remains because the sacrifices of orphans in the U.S. who are
not adopted are still greater than the potential sacrifices of parents who choose to adopt
instead of conceive. Even if parents must sacrifice a greater degree of happiness and must
care for a child with a physical or emotional problem, such sacrifices are not as great as
those that orphans in the U.S. must make if they are not adopted.
A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that 12% of children in the fos-
ter care system had not received routine health care, 34% had not received any immuniza-
tions, only 10% had received services to address developmental delays, and even though
three-quarters of the children were at high risk of exposure to HIV, fewer than 10% had
been tested.24 The lack of testing for HIV shortens children’s lives, for if caregivers are not
aware that a child has HIV, they may not ensure that the child takes vitamins, eats healthily
and exercises, all actions that prolong the lives of those with HIV and AIDS.25 The welfare
level of former foster children is indicative of foster care conditions. As many as 40% of
adults who were foster children are receiving welfare benefits or are in jail. Only about half
graduate from high school, compared to 78% of the general public, and their homelessness
rate is at least four times that of the general population.26 It is clear that the basic needs of
children in foster care, such as healthcare, education and the guidance and skills necessary
to become an adult who can meet basic needs and live a normal life, are often not being
met. Furthermore, children in foster care have no one who is certain to provide a stable
long-term relationship, and no one on whom they are certain they can rely for guidance or
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21 One could argue that if we are truly considering the interests of parents and children equally, and if parents thus
have a duty to adopt unless they would have to sacrifice something of comparable moral importance to what an
orphan would have to sacrifice if she were not adopted, parents must adopt unless doing so would require them
to sacrifice their lives, for orphans must sacrifice their lives if they are not adopted. I have instead argued that
potential parents must adopt unless doing so would require them to give up any of the basic necessities-that a
sacrifice of any of the basic necessities would constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to an
orphan’s sacrifice of her life. I explain my reasoning for doing so later.
22 Please see footnote 21.
23 “Costs to Adopt.” The Encyclopedia of Adoption. Ed. Christine Adamec and William L. Pierce, Ph.D. New York:
Facts on File Inc., 2000, p. 74-75.
24 U.S. General Accounting Office Foster care: Health needs of many children are unknown and unmet.Washington,
D.C.: GAO May 2002. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.21&filename=
he95114.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao
25“Pathology and Treatment.” Encyclopedia of AIDS. Ed. Raymond A. Smith. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn
Publishers, 1998, p. 10-13.
26 Thomas P. McDonald, et. al., Assessing the Long-Term Effects of Foster Care: A Research Synthesis.
Washington, D.C.: CWLA Press, 1996
even for love, for DCFS can and often does move foster children from family to family.27
Even children who are not moved from one foster family to another must live with the
knowledge that they could be taken from their families. While children in foster care have
no one that is certain to provide a stable long-term relationship, adoptive parents a perma-
nent lifelong relationship. In addition, while adults can have or seek a life partner or close
friends and family with whom they can have stable relationships, children are not as capa-
ble of building their own relationships, and when they do, they can be shattered if DCFS
moves the child.
Thus, even if adoptive parents must raise a child with physical or emotional prob-
lems, this would not require a sacrifice as great as the sacrifices foster children must make
if they are not adopted. The need, or more properly, the desire to have a child free of emo-
tional and physical problems is not as basic as the need for healthcare, to have a stable
long-term relationship and be loved or receive guidance to help live a life free of welfare or
jail. These needs are also far greater than the desire adoptive parents may have for the
potentially greater degree of happiness the parents might have experienced with a biologi-
cal instead of an adopted child. Thus, parents who cannot afford to adopt from overseas
still have a duty to adopt from the U.S.28 29
To conclude, if we give equal weight to each person’s interests, we have a duty to help
others up until the point where we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral
importance to what the recipient of our help would have to sacrifice if one did not receive
our help. This requires potential parents to adopt, for the sacrifices they must make if they
choose to adopt instead of conceive are not as great as the sacrifices orphans must make if
they are not adopted.
There are many implications of the duty to adopt instead of conceive. One implica-
tion is that the duty to avoid having biological children would involve abstaining from
intercourse before menopause and in the absence of certain infertility, for such intercourse
always risks conception.30 Forms of intimate contact that do not risk conception are obvi-
ously not included. Again, the sacrifice of intercourse is far smaller than the sacrifice of
one’s life or basic necessities such as health, dignity, the chance of living a normal life, an
education and the love of parents—sacrifices that a child must make each time parents
conceive instead of adopt. The need to have intercourse as opposed to other forms of inti-
mate contact is not as basic as the needs of orphans to stay alive or to have love, food, shel-
ter, physical safety and health. Yet most people, even those open-minded enough to agree
that the duty to abstain from intercourse does follow from equal consideration of interests,
will probably consider acting on this duty to abstain from intercourse absurd. Most people
are likely to deeply resist such self-denial for the sake of others. Yet such a reaction does
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27 Children in foster care are moved from one foster family to another an average of 3 times in the first two years
they are in care. Children in Foster Care James G. Barber and Paul H. Delfabbro. New York: Routledge Press,
2004.
28 There are approximately 550,000 children in foster care in the U.S. About 250,000 of them are waiting to be
adopted. It is thus clear that there will continue to be orphans in need of adoption in the U.S. for years to come.
(U.S. General Accounting Office Foster care: Health needs of many children are unknown and unmet.
Washington, D.C.: GAO May 2002. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=
162.140.64.21&filename=he95114.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao)
29 At this point, one might ask what duties the principle of equal consideration of interests places on people who
do not want children. Such people have the same duty that potential parents have to help others up until the
point where they would “thereby be sacrificing something of comparable moral importance” to what the recipi-
ent of their help would have to sacrifice if she didn’t receive their help. People who want children may fulfill
this duty by adopting children or by adopting children as well as helping in other ways. People who don’t want
children may fulfill this duty by helping in ways other than adoption. One example would be by donating
money to UNICEF to feed starving refugees. I will discuss the extent of this duty later.
30 Even surgical sterilization has a failure rate
not have any bearing on the logic or morality of my argument. The duty to abstain from
intercourse follows from a commitment to equal consideration of interests regardless of
resistance to such a duty. If people who believe that they are not inherently worth more
than orphans choose to have sex, they must admit that their actions are inconsistent with
their beliefs. At the very least, one would expect such people to admit this and to combine
surgical sterilization with another form of contraception or to use multiple forms of contra-
ception in general.
Another implication is that the human race will become extinct if all people act on the
duty to adopt instead of conceive. Yet regardless of the possibility of extinction, as long as
there remain people on earth who are struggling to meet their basic needs, we have a duty
to help them before we bring more people into the world. If one is considering the interests
of all equally, one must give more consideration to people who exist and who lack the basic
necessities than to people who are yet to exist and thus who do not have needs.
Furthermore, the interest people will have in continuing the human race or in having chil-
dren at all is again outweighed by the interests of people in having their basic needs met. If
humankind ever reached a stage where all children who need parents have been adopted
and the basic needs of all people were met, people could have children to prevent extinc-
tion.
What duties do parents have to the children of the world if the parents’ biological chil-
dren have already been conceived? If we apply the principle of equal consideration of inter-
ests, we find that these parents too have duties beyond what common morality dictates. Yet
it is true that the case of one’s own already existing children is the one case in which one
can incur a duty that trumps the duty to consider the interests of all equally. While the
interests of one’s biological child do not deserve more consideration because of the biologi-
cal relationship, one incurs a special duty to ensure emotional and physical health, which
involves a degree of prioritizing the child’s needs over those of other children.31 Thus, one
cannot consider the interests of all children equally when one has a child. Yet even though
one has a duty to care for one’s own children, because all children are equally deserving of
love and having their basic needs met, one has a duty to work to meet the basic needs of
other children as long as one can do so without neglecting the basic needs of one’s own
children. Consequently, one cannot justify providing any non-essential material goods—
more clothes than are necessary for warmth, food that is not necessary for health, meals at
restaurants, toys,32 trips, cars etc.—for one’s own children when the basic needs of other
children have not been met. Determining the amount of time and energy that one’s chil-
dren require for emotional health, and thus that one can justifiably give them when other
children are in far greater need, is more problematic than determining what material goods
are necessary and thus justifiable. It will undoubtedly vary according to the child. Parents
must make relatively subjective decisions, but such decisions should be governed by the
belief that other children are not worth less than one’s own child, and that therefore one
should help other children as much as possible while fulfilling the duty one has incurred to
ensure the physical and emotional health of one’s own children.
Fortunately, ensuring the emotional health of one’s own child and working to meet the
basic needs of all children are not mutually exclusive. By working with one’s own child to
raise money for UNICEF or volunteering with the child at a shelter for women and chil-
dren, one’s child may experience the joy that often comes with helping others and will gain
knowledge of how to be empathic. Thus, exposing one’s child to the experience of helping
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31 I admit that this exception to the duty to consider the interests of all equally is based on my opinion of duties
and is therefore arbitrary.
32 Some people may think it cruel to refuse children toys, particularly when their friends have toys. However it is
crueler to buy a toy for your child instead of donating the money you would have spent on the toy to UNICEF
because to do so would be to prevent UNICEF from using that money to feed a malnourished child.
others can offer her a possible path to happiness while allowing one to consider the inter-
ests of all children equally as much as possible by helping needy children.
Martha Nussbaum addresses the issue of obligations to the children of the world if
one’s biological child has already been conceived in For Love of Country. She questions the
morality of paying for an expensive college education for her daughter “while children all
over the world are starving and effective relief agencies exist.” Her conclusion is that pay-
ing for the expensive education is justified not because her daughter is worth more than
other children, but because doing so 
is the only sensible way to do good…if I tried to help all the world’s chil-
dren a little bit, rather than devote an immense amount of love and care to
Rachel Nussbaum, I would be no good at all as a parent…But that should
not mean that we believe our own…family is really worth more than the
children or families of other people-all are still equally human, of equal
moral worth.33
The problem with this reasoning is that it sets up a false dichotomy. Nussbaum is juxtapos-
ing focusing her care on one child against dividing it among all the world’s children. The
only way to do good if these are really one’s choices is obviously to focus on one child. But
in reality, she faces the choice of whether to pay for an expensive college education for her
daughter instead of using the money to feed a smaller number of children for whom the
money would mean the difference between life and death. Because this is really her choice,
and because parents are only justified in prioritizing their own children’s material needs
above the needs of far more needy children up until the age of eighteen,34 when their own
children are able to provide for themselves, it is clear that Nussbaum has a duty to help the
children in greater need. The starving children have the greater need because the sacrifice
her daughter would have to make if Nussbaum chose to give her college money to an
organization to feed starving children would not be anywhere near as great as the sacrifice
starving children would have to make if Nussbaum chose to pay for the college education.
These children would be sacrificing their lives, whereas her daughter would not even have
to sacrifice a college education. If she had to work her way through college, it might take
her over four years to graduate and she might have to spend some weekends working
instead of with friends, but these sacrifices are not basic necessities and are not nearly as
great as a starving child’s sacrifice of food. Nonetheless, parents do have a duty to continue
to provide emotional support and guidance for their children, for while children may be
able to work at age eighteen, they still require guidance, as they live in a complex world in
which it can be difficult to remain emotionally healthy and to make wise life choices. Thus,
while Nussbaum has a duty to use her material resources to help the children in the great-
est need, her duty to continue to provide support and guidance for her daughter would
continue. And if Nussbaum’s daughter could not work her way through college and thus
would have to sacrifice a college education if Nussbaum refused to support her, Nussbaum
would be justified in helping her to pay her tuition because a college education will give a
child the means to obtain a job that will allow her to meet her basic material and emotion-
al needs,35 and it is a parental duty to give one’s child these means.
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33 Nussbaum, Martha, ed. For Love of Country? Boston: Beacon Press, 2002, p. 135-136.
34 Admittedly, this is an arbitrary age to choose for when a person is able to provide for her own material well-
being. The development of reason, a prerequisite for being able to hold a job and provide for oneself, is a grad-
ual process that may or may not be complete by age eighteen. I chose eighteen because it seems that by this age
most people have developed the capacity to reason and to hold a job. Exceptions could be made for those with
more or less developed reasoning capacity.
35 Without a college education, it is almost impossible to obtain a job that will allow one to meet one’s basic mate-
rial needs without working so hard or under such conditions that one’s health is in jeopardy, and to earn
enough to allow one free time to spend helping others—a necessary prerequisite for fulfilling one’s emotional
need for a meaningful life. I will argue the case for this last point later.
These arguments contradict what most think is right, or place duties on people that they
would rather not have, has no bearing on their soundness or morality. Nonetheless, the princi-
ple the arguments are based on should be examined a bit more closely before considering
whether to reject common morality or the argument.
As mentioned earlier, the argument is based on Peter Singer’s principle of impartial con-
sideration of interests. This principle requires that equal weight be given to each person’s inter-
ests. If the same weight is given to others’ interests as one’s own interests, one must treat others
as one treat oneself. One maximizes the benefit one gives oneself,36 so one must maximize the
benefit one gives to others. Maximizing the benefit one gives to others would require deciding
how to act based on how one can provide the greatest benefit for humanity. The limitation on
this principle is that we as individuals have a moral duty to help others up until the point where
they would thereby be sacrificing something “of comparable moral importance” to what the
recipient of their help would be sacrificing if they did not receive their help. So if one person
could save the lives of ten terminally ill people by killing oneself and donating one’s body to
research for a cure, one would not be required to do so even though doing so would mean that
ten, as opposed to one, person must die. This limitation is necessary because if one has a duty to
consider the interests of all equally, one has a duty to treat oneself as one treats others, and
reducing one’s own level of welfare below that of those helped would not constitute treating
oneself as one treats others.37
If individuals consider the interests of all equally, they cannot give greater weight to their
own interests simply because they are theirs.38 They can only weigh their interests more heavily
than other’s interests in order to maximize good for humanity or to prevent making a sacrifice
of comparable moral importance to what the recipient of their help would be sacrificing if they
did not receive their help. What would constitute such a sacrifice of comparable moral impor-
tance will be elaborated on later.
It is important to note that equal consideration of interests—equal treatment—does not
entail identical treatment. Considering the interests of all equally allows individuals to treat
people differently according to their actions because all people who have done the same actions
are treated identically. They are treating people equally when they can jail a murderer but let a
philanthropist go free because they would jail all murderers. If they believe in equal treatment,
we treat people differently when this is the best way to maximize good for humanity, not
because some people are inherently worth less than others are. Hence they jail a murderer but
not a philanthropist because this is the best way to maximize good for humanity, not because
the philanthropist is worth less than the murderer. Similarly, they help people who are willing to
help themselves before those who are not because doing so will provide a greater benefit to
humanity, not because those who are less willing to help themselves are worth less than those
who are more willing to help themselves.
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36 In my opinion, human beings were designed by nature to survive. In order to survive, a being must work to maxi-
mize the benefits—food, shelter, etc.—it receives. Thus, the goal of all of our actions is inevitably self-benefit. Even
when one chooses to make a “sacrifice” for others—say, to spend Saturday afternoon volunteering at a soup kitchen
even though one would rather be napping, one wouldn’t voluntarily choose to do so unless doing so provided more
benefit than not doing so. In this instance, the benefit one might experience might be the satisfaction that one had
helped those less fortunate. This point is debatable, and I admit that it is one of the assumptions upon which my
argument is based.Yet it should be noted that even if one doesn’t think that we perform all of our actions in order to
benefit ourselves, one must admit that we treat ourselves well; in most cases, better than we treat others.Very few
people live up to the goal of doing unto others as they would have done unto them. If we are considering the inter-
ests of all equally, we have a duty to treat others as well as we treat ourselves even if we don’t believe we always strive
to maximize the benefit we confer on ourselves.
37 The limitation is also only necessary if we believe that the duty to consider the interests of all equally should trump
the duty to maximize good. I believe it should because otherwise the duty to maximize good could lead to sacrific-
ing the welfare of individuals for the greater good, which I disagree with. This is, admittedly, an opinion.
38 Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.13.
Equal consideration of interests also implies that people consider similar or equally
legitimate interests equally. They consider each equally hungry person’s interest in obtaining
food equally, but give more weight to the interest in obtaining food than the interest in
obtaining a new car; they give more weight to any basic necessities than to any other
desires—to needs according to how basic they are.
The principle of equal consideration of interests is based on the assumptions that pain
is bad, that all people have virtually the same capacity for pleasure and pain and that the
experience of the same pain is equally bad regardless of who experiences it—essentially that
all people have equal worth. If these premises are accepted, there is a duty to work to avoid
pain regardless of who experiences it, and this is what people do when they weigh the inter-
ests of all equally.
The assumption that all people have equal worth is debatable, for one can argue that
people’s actions affect their worth. For example, a murderer’s actions make the murderer
worth less than a philanthropist. There is no proof that all people have equal worth regard-
less of their actions. Yet even if one accepts that equality may be “a basic ethical principle, not
an assertion of fact,”39 we can still see that justice requires equal treatment. One who
believes that people’s actions affect their worth is likely to believe that justice requires treating
people differently according to one’s actions. Yet this belief does not provide a reason for fail-
ing to treat people equally, for treating people equally allows for differential treatment
according to one’s actions. As argued earlier, considering the interests of all equally allows
one to treat people differently according to their actions because one treats identically all
people who have done the same actions. One treats people equally when one can jail a mur-
derer but let a philanthropist go free because we would jail all murderers. Thus, those who
believe that people’s actions do affect their worth do not avoid the duty to treat people equal-
ly, for treating people equally allows them to treat people differently according to their
actions, and thus to remain true to their belief that people should be treated differently
according to their actions.
Those who believe that people’s actions do affect their worth give a different reason for
this differential treatment than those who believe that people have equal worth regardless of
their actions. The former argue that one should jail a murderer but not a philanthropist
because the murderer is worth less than the philanthropist rather than because this is the best
way to maximize good for humanity. But the reason one gives for differential treatment has
no bearing on the duty to treat people equally.
If people have a duty to help up until they would have to sacrifice something of compa-
rable moral importance to what the recipient of their help would have to sacrifice if they did
not receive their help, they must determine what constitutes a sacrifice of comparable moral
importance to the sacrifice of their lives, for there are always people who will die if they do
not help.40 One might argue that only one’s life is of comparable moral importance to
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39 Singer, Peter. Practical Ethics 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p.21.
40 The following are just a few examples of people dying due to lack of help.According to UNICEF, six million chil-
dren die totally preventable deaths each year. If aid organizations had enough funding, their lives could be saved with
basic, cost-effective measures such as vaccines, antibiotics, micronutrient supplementation, insecticide-treated bed-
nets, and access to safe drinking water. (http://www.unicef.org/childsurvival/index.html) According to Amnesty
International USA, 10,000 refugees are dying each month in the Sudan, mostly from the preventable ills of malnutri-
tion and disease due to poor sanitation.While more aid would not be able to stop these deaths entirely, it could great-
ly reduce them. (personal interview with Dr.William F. Schulz, executive director of Amnesty International USA,
10/26/2004 at Illinois Wesleyan University.) Aid agencies such as UNICEF are working to provide adequate food,
sanitation, vaccinations, and medical care in the Sudanese refugee camps.Yet according to UNICEF,“a much greater
effort is needed to provide adequate water, sanitation, food and health services.As yet, aid agencies have only
received about half the funding they need for their operations in Darfur.”
(http://www.unicef.org/emerg/darfur/index_23705.html) The World Food Program predicts that 2.8 million
Sudanese will die of starvation next year even if the civil war ends, for crops have not been planted or harvested due
to the fighting. (http://www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=2)
another’s life, and thus that the principle of equal consideration of interests would require
one to sacrifice everything except one’s life in the quest to help others. Yet the principle of
equal consideration can be seen as a form of rule utilitarianism,41 and if all people help
others to the point where they reduce their own welfare to a level just above death, a sacri-
fice of comparable moral importance to the sacrifice of one’s life in several ways would be
constituted. First, if people helped others to the point where they reduced their own welfare
to a level just above death-to the same level of welfare as the potential recipients of their
help-the helpers would then become the people who would sacrifice their lives if they did
not receive help, just as the potential recipients of their help would have sacrificed their
lives if they had not received help. The sacrifice of the lives of those who reduced their wel-
fare by helping others would be an equal sacrifice to the sacrifice of the lives of those who
would have died if they had not received help.42 Second, if all people helped others to the
point where they reduced their own welfare to a level just above death, no one would have
the strength to work and the economy would crash, which would further threaten every-
one’s ability to earn enough to stay alive. Third, in this state, no one could continue to help
others, for everyone would be trying to ensure one’s own survival. This would constitute a
sacrifice of comparable moral importance to the sacrifice of one’s life, not necessarily for
the helpers, but for the people the helpers could have helped in the future if they had main-
tained their ability to help. If the helpers could not help people in the future, people in the
future would have to sacrifice their lives. The sacrifice of the lives of people the helpers
could have helped in the future would be just as great of a sacrifice as the sacrifice of the
lives of people the helpers could have helped today by reducing their level of welfare to a
level just above death. Finally, if everyone helped others to the point where they reduced
their welfare to a level just above death, democracy could be threatened because when peo-
ple are desperate, they may rebel against their government and institute any regime that
promises to improve their material quality of life. Also, a democracy requires a level of edu-
cation that would probably not be reached if people were struggling to meet their basic
needs. The sacrifice of democracy would constitute sacrificing the principle of equal con-
sideration of interests itself because without a democracy, people are not likely to be treated
equally under the law. It would also constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral importance
to the sacrifice of one’s life because people are more likely to die at the hands of the govern-
ment under undemocratic than democratic regimes. Thus, we must consider a sacrifice of
any basic necessities—of what is necessary to maintain one’s physical and emotional health
and thus one’s life, the economy, one’s ability to continue to help others in the future, and
democracy—to be a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to another person’s sacrifice
of life.
If people have a duty to help others up until the point where they would be sacrificing
something of comparable moral importance to what the recipients of their help would be
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41 Will Kymlicka gives a nice explanation of rule utilitarianism. He writes that “rule-utilitarians argue that we should
apply the test of utility to rules, and then perform whichever act is endorsed by the best rules, even if another act
might produce more utility . . . we should assess the consequences, not simply of acting in a particular way on [one]
occasion, but of making it a rule that we act in that way.” (Kymlicka,Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 1990, p.27.) Thus, even though reducing one’s level of welfare to a level just above death could
potentially maximize the amount of help a single individual could give in that one instance, if all people reduced
their level of welfare in this way on a regular basis, this would not maximize the amount of help they could give for
the reasons described above.
42 One could argue that this would also be the case if a single individual instead of all people helped to the point where
she reduced her own level of welfare to a level just above death. I am not making that argument, though, because if
only one person as opposed to everyone reduced her level of welfare in this way, the lone person would probably be
able to receive help from other members of society, and would probably not die, whereas if all members of a society
reduced their welfare in this way, there would be a much greater likelihood that they would die, for it is more difficult
for an entire society of desperate people to help each other or to be helped than for one desperate individual in an
affluent society to be helped.
sacrificing if they did not receive their help, and sacrificing the things necessary to main-
tain their physical and emotional health—the basic necessities—would constitute a sacri-
fice of comparable moral importance to the sacrifice of one’s life, we must now determine
what is necessary to maintain our physical and emotional health. Doing so will allow them
to determine what exactly constitutes a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to the
sacrifice of their lives, and thus the ways in which they can justifiably nurture themselves
even when others are dying and we could save their lives by helping them instead of nur-
turing ourselves43.
Because deep relationships require time that could be used to save lives or that could
be used to earn money that could be spent to save lives, the decision to spend time on a
relationship instead of on helping means that another person will die. Those who doubt
this claim need only consider that a child dies of measles every minute and that UNICEF
needs only $7 to pay for a measles vaccination.44 It would seem that if people are truly
committed to considering the interests of all equally, they cannot justify having personal
relationships, for they take time and energy they could use to prevent the sacrifice of one’s
life, and the sacrifice of personal relationships does not appear to constitute a sacrifice of
comparable moral importance to the sacrifice of one’s life. Yet sacrificing personal relation-
ships would constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to the sacrifice of one’s
life because such relationships are a basic necessity. Sacrificing them would cause one to
sacrifice one’s mental and emotional health. Humans are social animals and need to form
deep bonds with one another.45 It is difficult to imagine a society in which people did not
take the time for personal relationships, but it is likely that without the emotional support
provided by spouses and close friends, people in such a society would not be able to func-
tion normally, which would threaten the economy and democracy, thereby constituting a
sacrifice of comparable moral importance as described earlier. Furthermore, people who
did not feel supported by stable loving relationships would also probably lose the will to
continue to help others. As argued earlier, the ability to help others in the future is compa-
rable to the sacrifice of one’s life because the sacrifice of one’s life on the part of people one
could have helped in the future is just as great of a sacrifice as the sacrifice of one’s life on
the part of people one could have helped today by using the time required by deep rela-
tionships saving lives instead. Even though the time and energy one must spend in order
to have personal relationships could have been spent saving the lives of others, spending
this time and energy on such relationships is justified because the sacrifice of such rela-
tionships would threaten the economy and democracy as well as the ability of people to
continue to save lives in the future, and these sacrifices constitute sacrifices of comparable
moral importance to the sacrifice of the lives one could have saved today if one had spent
the time and energy required by personal relationships saving lives instead.
If sacrificing deep personal relationships is not required by the principle of equal
consideration of interests, one might ask why sacrificing a relationship with one’s biologi-
cal child by adopting instead is required by the principle of equal consideration of inter-
ests. The answer is that sacrificing a relationship with one’s biological child by adopting
instead would not actually require one to sacrifice a deep personal relationship, for one
would still have such a relationship with an adopted child. A relationship with an adopted
child is a stable lifelong relationship in the same way that a relationship with a biological
child is. If adopting instead of conceiving would not cause one to sacrifice a deep personal
relationship, it would not require one to sacrifice the basic necessity of one’s emotional
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43 I do not mean to indicate that helping others and nurturing ourselves are in any way always mutually exclusive.
Indeed, I believe that more often than not, to give is to receive.
44 http://www.unicef.org/immunization/index_why.html
45 I admit this is an assumption.
health, and therefore would not constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to the
sacrifice of one’s life.
It is clear that material goods that are not necessary for physical health are not basic
necessities, and thus do not constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral importance. This
observation makes apparent the extent to which we must reconceive morality if we truly
believe that we have a duty to consider the interests of all equally. Singer writes that most peo-
ple in affluent countries today consider it generous to give money to famine relief. Those who
choose to buy new clothes or cars instead of giving to famine relief are not condemned and
do not feel that there is anything wrong with their actions. Yet if people gave the money they
would spend on non-necessities46 to famine relief, they would not be sacrificing any basic
necessities, and thus would not be sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance to
the lives of the potential recipients of their aid-what they will have to sacrifice if they do not
receive the food aid that the money spent on these non-necessities could provide. Yet if the
duty to consider the interests of all equally is taken seriously, it must be considered a duty
rather than an act of charity to give money to famine relief up until the point where one
would have to sacrifice something of comparable moral importance47—up until we would
have to sacrifice any of one’s basic necessities in order to ensure that others have the basic
necessities.
It is important to note here that any sacrifice that would prevent people from continuing
to meet their own basic needs would also constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral impor-
tance. Giving up health insurance, a job that allows one to save enough to provide for one’s
basic needs in the event of illness or old age, or savings that would allow one to do so would
all prevent people from continuing to meet their own basic needs in the future.48 Sacrificing
any of these three things would thus constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to
the sacrifice of one’s life, for a sacrifice of the basic necessities constitutes such a sacrifice. Of
course, it is impossible to know the amount necessary to save in order to care for oneself in
the event of illness. Yet, there must be a limit, lest one spend one’s life hoarding money.
Perhaps it is safe to assume that for a healthy person with health insurance, saving enough
money to live on for six months would be sufficient.
The material resources that one is justified in keeping for oneself in order to prevent sac-
rificing the basic necessities-in order to prevent making a sacrifice of comparable moral
importance to the sacrifice of one’s life has been considered. It has been argued that one is jus-
tified in providing for one’s own basic material needs even while others are starving because
doing so is necessary to prevent making a sacrifice of comparable moral importance. But can
one justify taking a vacation or going to a movie when one could spend the money on saving
the lives of children dying of measles by donating to UNICEF?49 How much leisure time is
necessary for mental health? Is one justified in having it because giving it up would constitute
a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to another person’s sacrifice of life? Ideally, one
would find that to give is to receive, and would often be fulfilled and rejuvenated by helping
others. Yet even if this were the case, sacrificing time off altogether would still almost
inevitably cause one to sacrifice one’s mental health. Consequently, decisions regarding the
amount of time and money one is justified in spending on oneself while over 2 million chil-
dren are dying each year for want of the seven dollars UNICEF needs to vaccinate a child
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46 Examples of non-necessities include clothes that are not necessary for warmth, cars that are not truly necessary to
get to work or school, tickets to the play, and food that is not necessary for health including dinners at restaurants.
47 This is the argument Peter Singer makes in the article Famine, Affluence, and Morality in Philosophy and Public
Affairs vol. 1 No. 3 Spring, 1972, p. 235.
48 This might not be true for some countries, such as the Scandinavian countries that have social welfare to the extent
that one would not have to sacrifice any basic necessities if one were dependent on the state for one’s survival. But it
is true in U.S. where those on welfare and without health insurance struggle to maintain their health.
49 According to UNICEF, over 770,000 children died of Measles in 2001, though the disease is preventable with a $7
vaccination series. (http://www.unicef.org/immunization/index_why.html)
against the major childhood diseases50 should be governed by the fact that spending time
rejuvenating is necessary for mental health. Yet such decisions must also be governed by the
fact that spending money rejuvenating is less necessary. It is important to take time off, but
one doesn’t need to spend that time in Barbados, getting a $30 massage, or even going to a $7
movie. One can rejuvenate with car trips, long walks, rented movies, or by sharing massages
with a friend. As long as one is considering the interests of all equally and there are starving
people in the world, one must choose these forms of self-care over more expensive ones.
If one is considering the interests of all equally, one has a duty to help others up until
the point where one would be sacrificing something of comparable moral importance to
what the recipient of one’s help would have to without one’s help. This constitutes maximiz-
ing the amount of benefit one can give to humanity, while maintaining the principle of equal
consideration of interests. Yet in order to maximize the amount of benefit one can give to
humanity, one must focus one’s help.51 If one has a million dollars, one will be able to help
more by using the money to found and run an orphanage for fifty children than by giving
one dollar to a million needy children. Similarly, one will be able to help more effectively if
one focuses one’s attention in order to gain specific knowledge of how to help a specific
group of people. This raises the question of how to focus help-how to choose who to help in
order to maximize good for humanity.
If people are considering the interests of all equally, they can only give greater weight to
the interests of any person over the interests of another when they have weighed the interests
of all equally and concluded that they can help humanity the most by doing so or when fail-
ing to do so would require a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to what the recipients
of their help would be sacrificing if they did not receive help,52 for this would constitute giv-
ing less weight to one’s own interests than to the interests of others. The severity of need
being experienced by the potential recipients of help, knowledge of how to best help those in
need, physical ability, and proximity to the needy are all factors that people must take into
consideration in determining how they can maximize good. However none of these provide
independent reasons for helping one person over another. If people are weighing the inter-
ests of all equally, the only reason for helping one person over another is because doing so
will allow them to maximize good for humanity or to prevent making a sacrifice of compa-
rable moral importance.
Yet common morality dictates that people choose whom to help based largely on their
relationships. It is acceptable for a woman to loan her brother $500 to fix his car simply
because the man is her brother even when there are far more needy people in the world.
However, if people are considering the interests of all equally, they can only help their family,
friends, or compatriots before others when it is the best way to maximize good for humanity
or when failing to do so would require a sacrifice of comparable moral importance. In this
instance, the woman could only help her brother over those with greater need if doing so
would allow her to maximize good for humanity or if either she or her brother would have
to sacrifice something of comparable moral importance to the lives of those who would have
to die if the woman gave the money to her brother instead of to them.
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51 Here, we see that focusing our help is not inconsistent with the principle of equal consideration of interests. It is
necessary in order to maximize good, which is necessitated by equal consideration. Furthermore, as long as we con-
sider the interests of all equally when choosing who to help—when choosing who we will treat differently—doing so
is not inconsistent with equal treatment, for equal treatment allows for differential treatment as long as we treat all of
the same kind of people (people with the same degree of need, who have done the same actions, who we can help
the same amount etc.) identically.
52 I made the argument earlier that because the principle of equal consideration of interests is a form of rule utilitari-
anism, a sacrifice of any basic necessities would constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral importance to the sacri-
fice of the lives of those who will die if we do not help.
In regard to the question of whether the woman would maximize good to humanity
by giving her brother the loan or by donating to UNICEF, it is almost certain that the
woman would do more good if she gave the $500 to feed starving children, even if her
brother needed the car to get to school or work. Yet one must not forget that one is treating
the principle of equal consideration of interests as a form of rule utilitarianism, and if all
people chose to help the more desperate instead of those in their own communities who
needed the help in order to prevent sacrificing a basic necessity (in this case, the ability to
work or to obtain an education), this would constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral
importance to the sacrifice of the lives of those who could have been helped. For an entire
society to sacrifice any basic necessities would constitute a sacrifice of comparable moral
importance for it would threaten the economy, everyone’s ability to stay alive, and democra-
cy. The fact that a person is one’s brother or from one’s community does not provide an
independent reason for helping. One can only help the local if this is the best way to maxi-
mize good or to prevent making an equal sacrifice. The situation above is an example of
when helping the local would be necessary to maximize good. If, however, all people chose
to help the more desperate instead of those in their communities who needed the help but
who didn’t need it in order to prevent sacrificing a basic necessity, they would be violating the
principle of equal consideration of interests, for they would be favoring the local even when
doing so was not necessary to maximize good or to prevent an equal sacrifice-a sacrifice of
any basic necessities.
Would the woman to sacrifice a basic necessity if she chose to give the $500 to starv-
ing children instead of her brother? If the car were not necessary for the brother to get to
work or school, it could not be considered a basic necessity. If the car were truly necessary
to get to work or school, sacrificing it would constitute a sacrifice of a basic necessity, and
the woman would be justified in loaning her brother the $500 instead of saving the lives of
starving children by donating the money to UNICEF. In this situation, the effect upon the
relationship of the woman’s choice to give the money to UNICEF instead of her brother
must be considered, for relationships are basic necessities. If failing to give the money to her
brother would destroy or severely damage their relationship, she and her brother would be
making a sacrifice of a basic necessity, and thus the woman could justifiably give the loan to
her brother. Yet giving money to loved ones should not be necessary for the health of rela-
tionships. If the other person in the relationship understands the commitment to equal
consideration of interests or believes in the principle, that person should understand the
decision to give the $500 to UNICEF to save the lives of hundreds of children instead, pro-
vided that one would not have to sacrifice a basic necessity without the loan, and the deci-
sion should not damage the relationship. Some forms of prioritizing one’s relationships over
helping others, such as giving emotional support to the other person in the relationship-are
of course necessary to maintain such relationships. But giving money should not be neces-
sary unless one is doing so to prevent the other person in the relationship from making a
sacrifice of comparable moral importance.
If the interests of all are equally considered, one has a duty to help those one can help
the most—in such a way as to maximize good for humanity—instead of those who happen
to be closest. One’s help usually makes the greatest difference for those in the greatest need.
Yet many try to justify the common practice of helping local people who have less severe
need instead of distant people who have more severe need by arguing that doing so is the
best way to maximize good. One argument they make is that individuals can do the most
good by helping local people because their familiarity with the needs of local people will
allow them to help more effectively than distant people. This argument does not consider
the fact that in almost every place in the world, aid agencies have people on the ground
who work daily with those they are trying to help. Ideally, these people speak the local lan-
guage, understand the culture, communicate with those in need and local aid agencies and
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know how to effectively help people, at least as much as the local YWCA knows how to
help people in any U.S. city. Donating money to any of these agencies is a way to give dis-
tant people the same kind of specific, responsive, effective help that is given local people
with whose needs we are personally familiar.
The argument that the best way to ensure that all people have their basic needs met is
for all the world’s people to care for the needy in their own local communities ignore the
fact that many people in poor countries do not have the resources to meet the basic needs
of people in their communities. Indeed, hundreds of millions do not have the resources to
meet their own basic needs. How can a refugee in Sudan who is struggling to escape geno-
cide and procure clean water and enough to eat work to help another refugee in the same
position? This is not to say that people should not be helped in such a way that they can
eventually help themselves and those in their communities. Self-sufficiency for the recipients
of aid should be the goal of all aid. However, people often need outside help to meet their
basic needs for nutrition and bodily safety before they are in a position to become self-suf-
ficient.
Another argument for why helping the local over the distant is the best way to maxi-
mize good is that the cost of transporting aid to distant people diminishes aid to the extent
that it does more good locally. This view does not take into account the ease of transfer-
ring money to distant people. A donation to UNICEF does not require any more effort on
the donor’s part than a donation to the local YWCA. Some of the money UNICEF receives
does go to flying their people and the needed food, medicine, etc. to distant needy people,
but the money we give to aid agencies like UNICEF makes the difference between life and
death for many of their aid recipients. When those in affluent countries help locally, the aid
usually does not make a dramatic difference in welfare, for those in affluent countries are
usually not threatened by starvation. Furthermore, the same amount of money provides
much more help in most poor countries than in affluent countries. For instance, UNICEF
can feed four malnourished children for a month with a donation of $15. It would take
hundreds of dollars to feed four children in the U.S. for a month. Thus, because the same
number of U.S. dollars can buy so much more aid in poor countries than affluent ones,
and because money can more often make the difference between life and death for those
in poor countries, the cost of transporting aid does not provide a reason for helping local-
ly, in affluent countries, over helping those in distant poor countries, who are in greater
need.
These arguments against claims that helping locally is the best way to maximize good
are not meant to indicate that helping local people with less severe need instead of distant
people with more severe need is never the best way to maximize good. Again, helping
locally is necessary in order to prevent the local from sacrificing the basic necessities, and
thus to prevent the society from making a sacrifice of comparable moral importance. Yet if
we are weighing the interests of them and the distant equally, allowing proximity of need
to trump severity of need is only justified when it is the best way to maximize good, and
this is not often the case in affluent countries.
One might argue that it would be nearly impossible to determine how to maximize
good—that a complicated method for determining how to maximize good would have to
be developed in order to do so. Yet spending time and resources trying to determine who
exactly will benefit the most from the help one can give would obviously be a waste of
resources that should go toward helping, and would thus keep one from maximizing good.
There are so many people in the world who are suffering so terribly that one should sim-
ply work to help people whose basic needs have not been met.
The objection to this will inevitably be raised that such a commitment requires peo-
ple to restrict their individual freedom, and thus their ability to fulfill their own desires,
too much. Yet all laws, belief systems and religions restrict people’s actions because there
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are greater goods than freedom.53 This is a law against murder because society believes the
right to life is more important than the freedom to kill. Morality inevitably requires duties
that restrict individual freedom.54 Consequently, in considering whether or not to adopt
the principle of equal consideration of interests, the freedom to take an expensive vacation,
to eat at a restaurant, to weigh the interests of those closest more heavily than the interests
of others, even when doing so is not necessary to maximize good or prevent a sacrifice of
comparable moral importance-is more important than the life of one of the 10,000
Sudanese refugees who are dying each month for want of aid or the life of a child who will
die of measles before this minute has passed for want of a seven dollar vaccination and this
must be considered. Perhaps, when one looks at the issue squarely in this manner, one will
conclude that justice does indeed require one to adopt the principle of equal consideration
of interests. Yet there is another motivation for adopting this principle. The greatest happi-
ness and meaning in life is experienced through giving to others, for to give is to receive.
This is true. Dare to discover it.
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53 An exception would be a belief system that held that anything anyone decided to do was always acceptable. I know
of no such system.
54 I should clarify here that the duties I have been advocating are voluntary duties that one would accept if one volun-
tarily committed oneself to considering the interests of all equally. I am not advocating that any government enforce
adherence to the principle of equal consideration of interests and its subsequent duties.
